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INTRODUCTION 
The decade proceeding the 9/11 tragedy has been very un-
kind to the human rights regime, as many western nations 
have committed human rights abuses in their mission to com-
bat terrorism. Both the United States and the United Kingdom 
have been engaged in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where 
they perpetrated terrible crimes and violated important ten-
ants of international law. These violations, ranging from alle-
gations of torture to wrongful deaths, are prohibited by human 
rights law. In fact, human rights treaties such as the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) were enacted 
with the express purpose of eliminating the very atrocities that 
have been committed in the “war on terror.” Unfortunately, the 
United States and the United Kingdom have maintained that 
human rights treaties do not apply beyond their territorial bor-
ders. The issue of the extraterritorial nature of the treaties is 
therefore crucially important because the crimes that have 
been committed by these two nations can only be remedied if 
the treaties can be interpreted to apply to the territory in ques-
tion.
1
  
On July 7, 2011, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) issued a landmark decision in Al-Skeini et al. v. The 
United Kingdom, overturning the United Kingdom’s House of 
Lords decision and issuing a strong precedent stating that hu-
man rights treaties should apply extraterritorially.
2
 Al- Skeini 
held that the ECHR applied to six Iraqi civilians who were 
killed while under the authority and control of the British mili-
tary during their occupation in 2003.
3
 This case is the most re-
cent of court opinions that have affirmed the notion that the 
object and purpose of a human rights instrument should be 
taken into heavy consideration when determining the extrater-
ritorial nature of a treaty. 
In determining whether human rights treaties apply extra-
territorially, it is necessary to analyze important provisions 
and terms in a particular agreement. However, as illustrated in 
                                                          
1 Damira Kamchibekova, State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Human 
Rights Violations, 13 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 87, 87 (2007). 
2 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589 
(2011). 
3 Id.  
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna 
Convention), the analysis of a human rights instrument often 
hinges on semantics. Traditionally, the meaning of a provision 
was based on the definiteness of the language and the plain 
meaning of the terms.
4
 Recently, however, courts such as the 
ECtHR have been reluctant to settle with the “ordinary mean-
ing analysis” of treaty interpretation (as suggested in Article 31 
of the Vienna Convention) when there are “manifestly absurd” 
results from adherence to such an approach.
5
 Instead, many in-
ternational courts have embraced the exceptions present in Ar-
ticle 32 of the Vienna Convention, allowing them to bring in 
subsequent state practice, context, purpose, and travaux pre-
paratoires.
6
  
Consequently, a complete understanding of the definitions 
of each word or phrase is essential to a proper analysis. As Jo-
anne Williams points out in her article, Al-Skeini: A Flawed In-
terpretation of Bankovic, jurisdiction and territory are not in-
terchangeable.
7
 "Jurisdiction refers to a particular sphere of 
legal competence, while "territory" refers to a geographical ar-
ea."
8
  While all actions occurring within the state's sovereign 
territory are within its jurisdiction, it does not follow that ac-
tions occurring extraterritorially are therefore outside of the 
state's jurisdiction.  
Most treaties are specific and clear to which geographical 
areas they apply.
9
 They contain provisions of territorial juris-
diction, limiting the treaties’ applicability to actions occurring 
                                                          
4 Blaine Sloan describes two competing views of treaty interpretation 
present during the drafting of the Vienna Convention. The United States’ 
theory, led by MacDougal, is largely contextual, with equal weight being giv-
en to the plain meaning, alongside the travaux and subsequent state practice.  
MacDougal’s theory of treaty interpretation ultimately lost out to the British 
method, which favored the plain meaning analysis. Under the British meth-
od, supplemental aspects were only brought into the analysis when adhering 
to the plain meaning left the meaning “ambiguous” or when the result would 
be “absurd.” Blaine Sloan, The United Nations Charter as a Constitution, 1 
PACE Y.B. INT’L. L. 61, 95 (1989). 
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
6 Id. 
7 Joanne Williams, Al Skeini: A Flawed Interpretation of Bankovic, 23 
WIS. INT’L L.J. 687, 691 (2005). 
8 Id. 
9 See Antoine Buyse, Legal Minefield - The Territorial Scope of the Euro-
pean Convention, 1 INTER-AM. & EUR. HUM. RTS. J. 269 (2008). 
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within the boundaries of the state. The European Convention, 
however, does not contain any such provision, and is unclear as 
to its territorial scope. Moreover, while the ICCPR does have a 
territorial provision, it has not been applied in that fashion. 
This Note discusses the extraterritorial application of both 
treaties, and specifically seeks to determine whether their pro-
visions apply to actions of state actors outside of their territo-
ries. 
Part I of this Note outlines the applicable international law 
and examines the history of the ECHR and the issue of its ex-
traterritorial application. This section will trace the history of 
this contentious issue through the past few decades, concen-
trating in particular on the ECtHR’s decision in Bankovic et al. 
v. Belgium et al. Part II will discuss the ECtHR’s decision in 
Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, and the Court’s rationale for its 
holding. Although the decision in Al-Skeini did not overturn 
Bankovic, it modified the precedent going forward, and stands 
as a monumental decision for extraterritorial application of 
human rights treaties.  
Part III weighs the impact of the Al-Skeini decision against 
the continued failure of the United States to apply their human 
rights instruments extraterritorially. Focusing on the applica-
tion of the ICCPR to human rights abuses across the world, 
this Note will outline the United States’ troubling perspective. 
It will close with the suggestion that the United States might 
be slowly accepting this growing international custom.  
I. THE LAW AND HISTORY 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) was opened for 
signature in Rome on November 4, 1950, and entered into force 
on September 3, 1953.
10
 In direct response to the atrocities 
committed during the Second World War, the nations of Europe 
enacted a human rights treaty to ensure that horrors, like 
those committed by the Axis powers, would never again occur.
11
 
                                                          
10 PIETER DIJK ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (3rd ed. 1998).  
11 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1, Motion Adopted by all Defense 
Counsel, The Avalon Project (Nov. 19, 1945), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
imt/v1-30.asp#1.  One of the big problems with prosecuting war criminals af-
ter the Second World War was that applying the Geneva Conventions retro-
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The preamble of the Convention aimed to secure “the universal 
and effective recognition and observation of human rights,” and 
ensure “fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of jus-
tice and peace in the world.”
12
  
For all the good intentions of the Convention, all treaties 
have limits on their applicability, and The European Conven-
tion was no exception. Within its first Article, it contains a ju-
risdictional restraint, stating: “The High Contracting Parties 
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”
13
 This article 
exists as a gateway to the human rights protections of the trea-
ty. Without satisfying the requirement that a person is “within 
the jurisdiction” of a High Contracting party-member, the 
Court cannot evaluate the substantive claims of the alleged vic-
tim.  
Whether the ECHR may be applied extraterritorially is not 
a trivial issue, for the Court’s determination of this question 
serves to define the overall purpose of the treaty. The Court 
faces a tough determination: Is the justification for the Conven-
tion “located in the intrinsic nature or inherent dignity of all 
human beings,” or in “the relationship between the Contracting 
States and this subset of persons [?]”
14
 Or, put more simply: 
Does this human rights treaty, and set of obligations it carries, 
apply to all persons, or to merely a specific subset of persons? 
While the issue might seem to revolve around an insignificant 
disagreement, the implication of valuing a jurisdictional rela-
tionship over promoting human rights worldwide is immense.  
                                                                                                                                  
actively went against all precepts of just law. During the Nuremberg trials, 
the Nazi defendants claimed that “[t]he present Trial can, therefore, as far as 
Crimes against Peace shall be avenged, not invoke existing international law, 
it is rather a proceeding pursuant to a new penal law, a penal law enacted 
only after the crime. This is repugnant to a principle of jurisprudence sacred 
to the civilized world.” Enacting human rights treaties such as the ECHR en-
sured this would no longer be an issue.  
12 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, preamble, Apr. 11, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 194, available at 
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm [hereinafter 
ECHR].  
13 Id. art. 1. (emphasis added). 
14 Erik Roxtrom, et. al., The NATO Bombing Case (Bankovic et al. v. Bel-
gium et al.) and the Limits of Western Human Rights Protection, 23 B. U. 
INT’L L.J. 55, 76 (2005) [hereinafter NATO Bombing Case]. 
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A. Early Cases 
The Court had dealt with the issue of the extraterritorial 
application of the ECHR in several cases before Al- Skeini et al. 
v. United Kingdom and Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al.. In 
1975, the Court decided Cyprus v. Turkey.
15
 In that case, Tur-
key argued that a communication from Cyprus was inadmissi-
ble because it related to alleged violations outside of Turkey’s 
(a Contracting state) territory.
16
 The Court disagreed with 
Turkey, holding: 
Taking into account the terms used and the purpose of the Con-
vention as a whole, state responsibility might be incurred by acts 
of the state that produce effects outside the national territory. 
The reason for this is that such agents remain under the state’s 
jurisdiction when abroad and they bring persons and property 
within this particular “jurisdiction” to the extent that they exer-
cise authority over them.
17
  
The Court clearly accepted the idea that actions by state 
actors outside of their territories could potentially amount to 
“jurisdiction.”
18
  
The Court reiterated the extraterritorial aspect of the Con-
vention’s application in the 1995 case Loizidou v. Turkey.
19
 
Loizidou, a Cypriot national, filed an application against Tur-
key for expelling her from her island home during Turkey’s in-
vasion of Cyprus in 1974.
20
 After the invasion, many Cypriots 
attempted to return to their homes, but were denied access by 
the Turkish military.
21
  
The ECtHR, concentrating solely on the question of wheth-
er the applicant’s complaint could fall within the “jurisdiction” 
of Turkey, again reaffirmed the principle that Article 1 was not 
limited to the territory of the Convention’s Contracting Par-
ties.
22
 Considering the object and purpose of the Convention, as 
                                                          
15 Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 4 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 125 (1975) [hereinafter Cyprus v. Turkey] 
16 Id. at 485. 
17 Id. (emphasis added).  
18 Id. 
19 Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) ¶ 61 (1995) (preliminary 
objections) [hereinafter Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections]. 
20 Id. ¶¶ 10-14. 
21 Id. 
22 NATO Bombing Case, supra note 14, at 78.  
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required by the second clause in Article 31 of the Vienna Con-
vention, the Court noted: “the responsibility of a Contracting 
Party may also arise when, as a consequence of military action 
. . .  it exercises effective control of an area outside its national 
territory.”
23
 Ultimately, the Court found that when a Contract-
ing Party exercised effective control of an area, or people within 
the area, the Convention’s Article 1 jurisdictional requirement 
was met.
24
 
B. Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al. 
In 2001, the ECtHR established new precedent in 
Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al.
25
 This case dealt with the issue 
of the extraterritorial application of the ECHR involving hu-
man rights violations committed solely through military air-
strikes. The applicants in Bankovic, all citizens of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”), petitioned the ECtHR to hold 
the nations of NATO accountable for the many deaths that re-
sulted from the bombing campaign in Serbia.
 26
 
In 1998, armed conflict erupted between members of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army, forces of the FRY, the Serbian police, 
and paramilitary groups.
27
 After the breakdown of diplomatic 
negotiations, human rights violations continued to ensue. On 
March 24, 1999, NATO announced the beginning of air strikes 
on the FRY.
28
 On April 23, 1999, sixteen people were killed, 
and sixteen more wounded, when a building housing three tel-
evision channels and four radio stations was hit by a missile 
launched from a NATO aircraft.
29
 Alleging breaches in Articles 
2, 10, and 13 of the ECHR, the appellants sought to invoke the 
European Convention against the NATO forces.
30
  
The Court in Bankovic began its analysis, stating that the 
proper way to evaluate Article 1 is enshrined in Articles 31 and 
                                                          
23 Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, ¶ 62. (emphasis added). 
24 Id. ¶ 64. 
25 Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al., 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 [hereinaf-
ter Bankovic v. Belgium]. 
26 Id. ¶ 1. 
27 Williams, supra note 7, at 689 (describing the escalation of violence in 
FRY that led to the NATO attacks.). 
28 Id. at 690. 
29 Bankovic v. Belgium, ¶10.  
30 Williams, supra note 7, at 690.  
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32 of the Vienna Convention.
31
 Thus, the Court primarily fo-
cused on the ordinary meaning of the phrase “within their ju-
risdiction” in its context, and in the light of the object and pur-
pose of the convention. 
32
 It held that as to the ordinary 
meaning of the term in Article 1, “the jurisdictional competence 
of a State is primarily territorial.”
33
 While acknowledging that 
international law does not explicitly “exclude” the application 
of jurisdiction extraterritorially, the ECtHR noted: “the sug-
gested bases of such jurisdiction are, as a general rule, defined 
and limited by the sovereign territorial rights of the other rele-
vant states.”
34
 
The Court in Bankovic established Article 1 jurisdiction as 
being primarily territorial, deviating from their previous case 
law. In previous cases, the Court held that “jurisdiction was not 
limited to the national territory of the High Contracting Par-
ties.”
35
 The justices in Bankovic, to comply with the early prec-
edent, held that there were exceptional circumstances under 
which the Convention could apply beyond the territory of the 
Contracting state.
36
 Therefore, the Court found that “Article 1 
of the Convention must be considered to reflect this ordinary 
and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of 
jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justifica-
tion in the particular circumstances of each case.”
37
  
The creation of this category of exceptional cases redefined 
much of the ECtHR’s prior precedent. Labeling cases such as 
Cyprus v. Turkey (1975)
38
 and Loizidou v. Turkey (1995)
39
 as 
                                                          
31 Bankovic v. Belgium, ¶ 18.  
32 Id. ¶ 19.  
33 Id. ¶ 59.  
34 Id. (emphasis added). The Court cited several authorities for this find-
ing including The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, and The Doc-
trine of Jurisdiction in International Law, Twenty Years Later, by Thomas 
Mann. Oppenheim notes that “territoriality is the primary basis for jurisdic-
tion,” and Brownlie states that “jurisdiction is territorial.” Williams, supra 
note 7, at 692. This role that this notion of territorial jurisdiction played in 
the Court’s rationale in Bankovic was very contentious. Some scholars be-
lieved that the European Convention’s view on the term “within its jurisdic-
tion”, should be based on its unique object and purpose as a Human Rights 
Treaty. See NATO Bombing Case, supra note 14, at 70.  
35 Williams, supra note 7, at 692.  
36 Bankovic v. Belgium, ¶ 74.  
37 Id. ¶ 61. 
38 Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 72 (1975). 
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exceptions to a general principle lead to the conclusion that 
there was a bevy of case law under which extraterritorial juris-
diction was deemed inadmissible. As some scholars maintain in 
their criticisms of the Bankovic decision, the Court’s findings 
were mischaracterized and directly misleading, focusing only 
on their apparent desire to establish that “the scope of the 
Convention was territorial.”
40
 Ultimately, whether intentional 
or not, the Bankovic interpretation of jurisdiction varied con-
siderably from the Court’s past determinations and narrowed 
the extraterritorial capacity of Article 1 going forward.  
In defining cases of extraterritorial applicability as excep-
tional¸ the Bankovic case outlined several exceptions to the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction principle. The first exception centers on the 
exercise of state authority outside the state territory. The 1999 
case Drozd & Janousek v. France & Spain best characterized 
this exception.
41
 It held that French and Spanish judges work-
ing in Andorran Courts were imputable to their home nations 
due to the level of influence they held outside of their territo-
ry.
42
 This exception reflects a modern legal interpretation of ju-
risdiction that arises when there is “a substantial and genuine 
connection between the subject-matter of the jurisdiction . . . 
and the territorial base.”
43
 While the Court did not ultimately 
hold France and Spain accountable for their justices’ actions, 
they did state that jurisdiction extended beyond their borders 
in such circumstances.
44
 
Bankovic’s second exception to the rule of territorial juris-
diction is often labeled “effective control.”45 First introduced in 
Loizidou v. Turkey¸ this exception stands for the proposition 
that a Contracting Party’s culpability may “arise when, as a 
consequence of military action . . . it exercises effective control 
of an area outside its national territory.”
46
 This control element 
                                                                                                                                  
39 Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) 
(1995) (Preliminary Objections).   
40 NATO Bombing Case, supra note 14, at 87.  
41 See Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) (1992).  
42 Id. 
43 Williams, supra note 7, at 697.  
44 DIJK ET AL., supra note 10, at 10.  
45 See e.g. Al-Skeini Ors, R (on the application of) v. Secretary of State for 
Defence [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1609, [190]-[197], [2007] Q.B. 140 (Eng.) [herein-
after Al-Skeini et al. v. Secretary of State for Defence 1]. 
46 Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, ¶ 62. 
2013] EXTRATERR’L APP. OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 425 
could be satisfied either by military forces, or by the setup of 
official organs or facets of local administration.
 47
 The factors 
must all be considered on a case-by-case basis.
48
 The Court in 
Loizidou did not fully establish what constituted “effective con-
trol,” but held that it was satisfied by the presence of over 
30,000 Turkish troops in Northern Cyprus.
49
 
The Court in Bankovic did not expand on the definition of 
“effective control,” but rather held that the NATO’s aerial bom-
bardment did not “secure effective control over the territory.”
50
 
The Court’s holding indicates a necessity for the presence of 
ground forces in order to secure substantial control of the peo-
ple and the territory.
51
 Bankovic’s holding, concerning the abil-
ity of airstrikes to constitute “effective control,” has been criti-
cized as not taking into consideration the Convention’s “living” 
and “breathing” nature.
52
 Additionally, since the Court did not 
fully define this exceptional principle of “effective,” Bankovic 
served only to narrow the scope of Loizidou, and created confu-
sion moving forward. 
The third exception to the doctrine of territorial jurisdic-
tion involved the activities of consular agents acting abroad, or 
on board vessels “registered in, or flying the flag of, that 
state.”
53
 This exception, sometimes referred to as the “consent,” 
or “acquiescence” exception, applies to agents acting in a state 
with the state’s consent.
54
 The Bankovic Court held that under 
such conditions, “customary international law and treaty provi-
sions have recognized the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdic-
tion by the relevant State.”
55
  
The ECtHR’s description of the exceptional cases under 
                                                          
47 Id. 
48 Id. at ¶ 61. 
49 Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 513, ¶ 56 (1996) (judgment on the 
merits). 
50 Bankovic v. Belgium, ¶ 75.  
51 See id.  
52 Williams, supra note 7, at 703. Williams discusses the main criticism 
that several scholars have voiced considering the effective control of a nation 
or people via airpower. She argues “great accuracy and impact achieved by 
modern weapons without the need for ground troops makes reliance on the 
difference between air attack and ground troops unrealistic.” Williams, supra 
note 7, at 704. 
53 Bankovic v. Belgium, ¶ 73.  
54 Williams, supra note 7, at 707.  
55 Bankovic v. Belgium, ¶ 73. 
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which Article 1’s jurisdiction could be granted extraterritorially 
was brief and vague. What the Court did make clear was the 
“exceptional nature” of the cases, and the primarily territorial 
nature of jurisdiction. Ultimately, the ECtHR decided that the 
case before them did not fall under any exceptional category. 
The NATO militaries did not fit under the first exception as 
there was no exercise of “legal authority” in the FRY. The 
Court contentiously held that NATO powers did not fit under 
the second exception of “effective control” because of the aerial 
nature of the military operation. The military powers were also 
clearly not operating in the FRY with the consent or acquies-
cence of the FRY, and therefore, the Court held that this case 
was not an exceptional circumstance for which the jurisdiction 
of the European Convention could be invoked.
56
 
Another important determination by the ECtHR in 
Bankovic was in refining the scope of the extraterritorial ap-
plicability only to countries within the boundaries of the Euro-
pean continent.
57
 The Court classified the Convention as a 
“constitutional instrument of European public order,”
58
 and 
held that its role was to monitor engagements between the 
Contracting Parties.
59
 Essentially, the Court did not believe 
that the benefits of the Convention should apply to non-
Contracting States: 
In short, the Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating… in 
an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space 
(espace jurisdique) of the Contracting States… The Convention 
was not designed to be applied throughout the world, even in the 
respect of the conduct of Contracting States.
60
 
Ultimately, the FRY does not fall within this “espace ju-
risdique,” and though the justices recognized a desire to avoid a 
vacuum or black hole of human rights, they held that this de-
sire should only materialize in areas normally covered by the 
Convention.
61
  
                                                          
56 Id. ¶ 71. 
57 Id. ¶ 80.  
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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II. AL-SKEINI ET AL. V. UNITED KINGDOM (2011) 
On July 7, 2011 the European Court of Human Rights de-
cided Al-Skeini et al. v. United Kingdom, the most recent opin-
ion concerning the extraterritorial nature of jurisdiction within 
Article 1 of the European Convention.
62
 The decade following 
the Bankovic decision that preceded this case has arguably 
been the most critical decade for human rights treaties since 
the end of the Second World War. While members of the inter-
national community are currently fighting a “war on terror,” 
and two ongoing conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
question of extraterritorial jurisdiction is of particular im-
portance. Fortunately, in issuing their judgment in Al-Skeini, 
the ECtHR held that the ECHR did apply to the United King-
dom’s military forces in Iraq, furthering the custom that hu-
man rights treaties will not be hamstrung by strict interpreta-
tion or semantic-driven arguments.
63
 
A. The Facts  
On March 20, 2003, following Iraq’s alleged disregard of 
United Nations Security Council Resolution (1441), the United 
States, United Kingdom, and several other countries, invaded 
Iraq.
64
 “By April 5, 2003, the British had captured Basrah, and 
the United States had gained control of Baghdad.”
65
 After “ma-
jor combat operations” were deemed complete on May 1, 2003, 
the British and Americans created the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) to “exercise powers of government temporari-
ly.”
66
 Among the CPA’s self-appointed duties were to “provide 
for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of 
transitional administration,” and to “restore conditions of secu-
rity and stability.”
67
 Accordingly, the CPA was divided into re-
                                                          
62 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 589 
(2011).  
63 Id. 
64 Id. ¶ 10. Resolution 1441 sought to afford Iraq a final opportunity to 
comply with its disarmament obligations and submit itself to future inspec-
tions.  
65 Id. 
66 U.N. Security Council, Letter dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent 
Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Pres-
ident of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/538 (May 8, 2003).  
67 PAUL BREMER, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY REGULATION NO. 1, 
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gional areas—including CPA South, which was under the re-
sponsibility and control of the United Kingdom.
68
 
The petitioners in Al-Skeini were relatives of six Iraqi citi-
zens killed in southern Iraq, a territory under which the Unit-
ed Kingdom had temporary authority. The petitioners alleged 
that their relatives fell into the jurisdiction of the United King-
dom, a Contracting State of the ECHR; along with a breach in 
Article 2 of the Convention resulting from the lack of effective 
investigation into the questionable deaths of their relatives.
69
 
These six deaths occurred between May 8, 2003 and November 
10, 2003, after major military operations were deemed com-
pleted and the CPA had been established.
70
  
One applicant in Al-Skeini was the father of Ahmen Jab-
bar Kareem Ali, a 15-year-old boy who was killed in Iraq on 
May 8, 2003.
71
 According to the applicant, upon hearing that 
British soldiers had arrested some Iraqi youths, and after his 
child had not returned home as expected, he went looking for 
his son.
72
 The applicant was informed by another young Iraqi 
that he and the missing boy had been “arrested by British sol-
diers the previous day, beaten up, and forced into the waters of 
the Shatt Al-Arab.”
73
 The British police were notified, but hav-
ing spent several days waiting and searching, the applicant 
found his son’s body in the Shatt Al-Arab on May 10, 2003.
74
  
The victim’s father brought the body immediately to the 
British police, who told him to go to a hospital, which was not 
equipped to conduct a post mortem inspection.
75
 After burying 
his son, in accordance with Islamic practice, the applicant re-
turned to the British police station to ask for an investigation, 
but was informed that it “was not the business of ‘the British 
police’ to deal with such matters.”
76
 In a trial process that the 
applicant found “confusing,” “intimidating,” and “biased in fa-
                                                                                                                                  
CPA/REG/16 MAY 2003/01 (May 16, 2003). 
68 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, ¶ 13.  
69 Id. ¶ 3.  
70 Id. ¶¶ 34-71.  
71 Id. ¶ 55 (Ali’s father was referred to as the “fifth” applicant in the court 
opinion.). 
72 Id. ¶ 56.  
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. ¶ 57.  
76 Id, ¶ 58. 
2013] EXTRATERR’L APP. OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 429 
vor of the accused,” the defendants were acquitted as a result of 
the applicant’s evidence being “inconsistent and unreliable.”
77
 
Another applicant claimed his 23 year-old brother Hazim 
Al-Skeini, was killed by British soldiers just before midnight on 
August 4, 2003, in Basra.
78
 According to the applicant, various 
members of his family were gathering at his house for a funeral 
ceremony on the evening of his brother’s death.
79
 As he was 
welcoming guests to his home, the applicant saw Al-Skeini 
gunned down by British soldiers as he was walking towards the 
house.
80
 The applicant contends that his brother was unarmed 
and roughly ten meters away from the soldiers when he was 
shot, and that he “had no idea why the soldiers opened fire.”
81
 
According to the British, the patrol approached on foot and 
heard gunfire from different points.
82
 They saw the applicant’s 
brother on the dark street, believed him to be pointing a gun in 
their direction, and opened fire on him.
83
 The sergeant of the 
patrol gave no verbal warning before firing, but believed that 
his life and those of the other soldiers in the patrol “were at 
immediate risk.”
84
 The head Brigadier was satisfied that the 
actions of the sergeant fell within the Rules of Engagement, 
and did not order any further investigation. 
85
 
The circumstances surrounding the other four deaths were 
similar in nature to the aforementioned occurrences.
86
 They all 
                                                          
77 Id. ¶ 60.  
78 Id. ¶ 34 (Al-Skeini’s brother was referred to as the “first” applicant.). 
79 Id.  
80 Id. ¶ 35.  
81 Id. 
82 Id. ¶ 36.  
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. ¶ 37.  
86 The “second” applicant was the widow of Muhammad Salim, who was 
killed shortly after midnight on November 6, 2003. As part of a raid, British 
soldiers broke down the door of a house. One of the soldiers came face-to face- 
with the second applicant’s husband in the hallway of the house and shot 
him. There was “no time” to give a verbal warning. Company Commander felt 
the incident fell within the Rules of Engagement and did not require any fur-
ther investigation. Id. ¶¶ 39-42. The “third” applicant was the widower of 
Hannan Mahaibas Sadde Shmailawi, who was killed on November 10, 2003, 
while sitting for dinner with her family. The applicant, his wife, and family 
were sitting around the dinner table when “there was a sudden burst of ma-
chine gun-fire.” His wife was struck by bullets in the head and ankles and 
died at a hospital shortly after the attack. The British claimed that the appli-
cant’s wife was shot during a fight between a British patrol and group of “un-
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contained questionable activities by British military personnel 
and a lack of due process in investigating the deaths. However, 
regardless of the substantive nature of the petitioners’ allega-
tions regarding the deaths of their relatives, questions on the 
merits become moot if the ECHR cannot be applied extraterri-
torially. Without issuing perspective on the merits of the indi-
vidual cases,
87
 we can accept as true the assertion that there is 
at least a genuine issue of alleged human rights violations in-
volved. Accordingly, the query becomes whether the petitioners 
fall “within the jurisdiction” of the United Kingdom in order to 
let their pleas be heard. 
B. The Holding 
The British courts first heard Al-Skeini in March of 2004, 
when the Divisional Court held that in line with Bankovic, ju-
risdiction under Article 1 of the Convention was territorial.88 
                                                                                                                                  
known gunman.” Colonel came to the conclusion that the incident fell within 
the Rules of Engagement and did not require any further investigation. Id. 
¶¶ 43-46. The “fourth” applicant was the brother of Waleed Sayay Muzban, 
who was shot and killed on the night of August 24, 2003. The victim was driv-
ing a minibus with curtains drawn over its windows. The bus was stopped by 
a British patrol, and when the driver reacted “aggressively” to the British of-
ficers and sped off, British officers shot out the tires of the bus. The officers 
then contend that the victim appeared to be reaching for a weapon and yell-
ing to people in the back of the bus. The officers then fired five rounds into 
the bus, killing the fourth applicant’s brother. There were no weapons found 
or people in the back of the bus. The Brigadier concluded the officer’s actions 
fell within the Rules of Engagement and needed no further investigation. Id. 
¶¶ 47-51. The “sixth” applicant is the father of Baha Mousa, who was 26 
when he died in the custody of the British Army, three days after an arrest by 
soldiers on September 14, 2003. He was told his son had been killed in custo-
dy at the British military base in Basrah. When identifying the body, he 
found his son’s “body and face were covered in blood and bruises; his nose 
was broken and part of the skin of his face had been torn away.” One witness 
stated that the Iraqi detainees were “hooded, forced to maintain stress posi-
tion, denied food and water, and kicked and beaten.” While seven soldiers 
were charged with criminal offenses in connection with Baha Mousa’s death, 
the charges were dropped against four of them and two others were acquit-
ted. Id. ¶¶ 63-68.   
87 The specific details regarding the deaths of the six petitioners’ rela-
tives vary on a case to case basis. Some are more egregious than others. In 
some of the cases, the human rights violation might simply have been the 
failure of the British military to conduct sufficient investigation, making the 
injustice primarily procedural. In those cases, the actions of the British sol-
diers may have been reasonable. But this determination of fact must be ac-
corded the proper process.  
88 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, ¶ 74.  
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The Court of Appeals affirmed this view and further opined 
that the “effective control” exception was not applicable be-
cause “the combination of terrorist activity, the volatile situa-
tion, and the ineffectiveness of Iraqi security forces meant that 
the security situation remained on a knife-edge for much of the 
tour.”89 The House of Lords again affirmed this case in 2007, 
regarding Bankovic as “watershed authority,” and holding that 
application of the effective control principle beyond the Council 
of Europe would be “contrary to the inescapable logic of the 
Court’s case law.”90  
The European Court of Human Rights accepted the peti-
tioners’ application in 2007, and decided to hear the case.91 It is 
important to note that prior to the discussion of whether juris-
diction of the European Convention should be applied extrater-
ritorially, the ECtHR introduced a number of relevant interna-
tional legal materials demonstrating a liberal view of human 
rights treaty interpretation in favor of supporting the object 
and purpose of the treaties themselves.92 This type of interna-
tional case law was notably absent from the Bankovic decision, 
and foreshadowed the Court’s intent to interpret Article 1 in a 
way to ensure the universal protection of human rights.  
In particular, the Court cited the International Court of 
Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory.93 
In this case, the Court applied the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights extraterritorially, even though the 
language in Article 2, paragraph 1 states that a subject must 
be “within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”94 The 
advisory opinion noted that the provisions of the Covenant ap-
ply extraterritorially “for all conduct by the State party’s au-
thorities or agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment 
                                                          
89 Al-Skeini et al. v. Secretary of State for Defence 1, ¶ 122. The Court 
held that the sixth applicant’s son fell under the exception of Bankovic by his 
death occurring in a British military prison, operating in Iraq with the con-
sent of the Iraqi authorities. 
90 Al- Skeini et al. v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26,  
[127], [2008] A.C. 153. 
91 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, ¶ 1. 
92 Id. ¶¶ 89-94. 
93 Id. ¶ 90 (citing Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 179 (July 
9, 2004) [hereinafter Israeli Wall Case]. 
94 Israeli Wall Case, ¶ 108.  
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of rights enshrined in the Covenant and fall within the ambit of 
State responsibility of Israel under the principles of public in-
ternational law.”95 Though the ICJ was interpreting the 
ICCPR, this opinion influenced the ECtHR, because it applied 
the treaty extraterritorially and placed a heavy reliance on its 
object and purpose. 
Consistent with Bankovic, the Al- Skeini Court ruled that 
a state’s jurisdiction is primarily territorial.96 Similarly, the 
Court held that its case law has recognized a number of excep-
tional circumstances capable of warranting jurisdiction beyond 
the borders of the Contracting State.97 The first exception cre-
ated jurisdiction when the acts of diplomatic and consular 
agents exert authority and control over others outside of the 
territory of the State.98  
The Al- Skeini Court recognized a second “consent” or “ac-
quiescence” exception, arising when “in accordance with cus-
tom, treaty, or other agreement, authorities of the Contracting 
State carry out executive or judicial functions on the territory 
of another state.”99 Next, the Court held that the use of force by 
a State’s agents operating outside its territory may bring the 
individual brought under the State’s control into Article 1 ju-
risdiction.100 To illustrate this case, the ECtHR cited Ocalan v. 
Turkey, where the Court held that after the petitioner was 
handed over to Turkish officials, he was “effectively under 
Turkish authority,” allowing him to qualify for Article 1 juris-
diction.101 The essential characteristic of this exception was 
that the power and control is over the person in question. 
The Court next discussed Bankovic’s “effective control” ex-
ception. While the Justices had further defined the previous 
exceptions, they had stayed more or less true to the Bankovic 
precedent. However, with “effective control,” the Court expand-
ed on its narrow interpretation in Bankovic, and provided some 
additional factors to consider when determining whether this 
                                                          
95 Id. ¶ 110.  
96 Al- Skeini v. United Kingdom, ¶ 131. 
97 Id. ¶ 132.  
98 Id. ¶ 134.  
99 Id. ¶ 135. 
100 Id. ¶ 136. 
101 Id. (citing Issa and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 55721/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(1996); Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08 
(2010)). 
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qualification was met.102 The Court stated that when determin-
ing whether the standard is met, “the Court will primarily have 
reference to the strength of the State’s military presence in the 
area.”103 The ECtHR also noted, however, that “other indica-
tors” may be relevant, such as how much the State’s “military, 
economic and political support” for the local administration 
gives the occupying State control over the region.104 The “effec-
tive control” test appears to be much more inclusive in this case 
than as portrayed in Bankovic.  
Al- Skeini also disagreed with Bankovic’s notion of a Con-
ventional legal space (“espace jurisdique”). While the Court 
noted that the convention is an “instrument of European public 
order,” and that the Convention applies solely within its “legal 
space,” it also noted that the Convention does not imply that 
Article 1 jurisdiction can never exist extraterritorially.105 The 
Convention may dictate where jurisdiction applies, however, 
that does not necessarily indicate that the absence of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction, outside of the Council of Europe, cannot 
exist. Al- Skeini’s interpretation, while potentially creative, 
harmonizes much more cleanly with the object and purpose of 
the European Convention as a human rights treaty.  
Applying the facts of the Al-Skeini cases, the Court found 
that the situation in Iraq constituted “exceptional circumstanc-
es.”106 According to the ECtHR, the United Kingdom, through 
its soldiers, engaged in “security operations,” and “exercised 
authority and control over individuals killed in the course of 
such security operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link 
between the deceased and the United Kingdom for purposes of 
Article 1 of the Convention.”107 Therefore the Court in Al-
Skeini both invoked the third and fourth exception, where per-
sons and areas came under the “effective control” of British 
military.  
Though the ECtHR’s decision in Al-Skeini is extremely re-
cent, and has not yet been held to the scrutiny of peer review, 
one criticism it has faced was from one of its concurring justic-
                                                          
102 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, ¶ 138-39.  
103 Id. ¶ 139.  
104 Id.  
105 Id. ¶ 141-42. 
106 Id. ¶ 149. 
107 Id.  
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es. Justice Bonello argued that the Court did not go far enough 
in establishing a bright line rule in protecting human rights in-
terests.108 Bonello was unwilling to accept what he views to be 
an “a la carte” respect for human rights,109 stating: “[a]ny state 
that worships fundamental rights on its own territory but then 
feels free to make a mockery of them anywhere else does not . . 
. belong to the comity of nations for which the supremacy of 
human rights is both mission and clarion call.”110 More suc-
cinctly, Justice Bonello believed the United Kingdom was argu-
ing that the Convention was “ratified . . . with the deliberate 
intent of regulating conduct of its armed forces according to lat-
itude. Gentlemen at home, hoodlums elsewhere.”111 
Regardless of Bonello’s concurrence, the ruling in Al-Skeini 
is an encouraging sign for the extraterritorial applicability of 
the ECHR. Not only did this case expand upon the notion of “ef-
fective control,” but it also eliminated the espace jurisdique ar-
gument, which, under Bankovic, prohibited the application of 
the European Convention beyond Europe’s borders. Al-Skeini 
speaks to the object and purpose of the Convention as a human 
rights treaty needing to be enforced universally as such.  
Court decisions like Al-Skeini et al. v. United Kingdom 
have strengthened the notion of customary law that States are 
bound by human rights treaties and obligations not only within 
their territories, but beyond their borders and throughout the 
world. Fortunately, there appears to be a growing tradition of 
international courts liberally applying jurisdictional require-
ments in order to secure the object and purpose of these human 
rights treaties. This encouraging sign indicates that these 
courts are more focused on promoting human rights and elimi-
nating legal vacuums and black holes where nations can perpe-
trate human rights violations without any accountability. 
III. THE UNITED STATES AND THE “WAR ON TERROR” 
In the decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United 
States has taken several steps backwards in international hu-
man rights law. Certainly, the United States has never been a 
                                                          
108 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, (Bonello, G., concurring, ¶ 18). 
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leading proponent of the international human rights regime, 
often displaying a “s[k]eptical” and “stand-offish” attitude to-
wards embracing human rights provisions.112 However, the ag-
gressive counterterrorism strategies employed by the United 
States in response to Al- Qaeda’s attacks on U.S. soil arouse se-
rious human rights concerns.113 The failure of the United 
States, the world’s only superpower, to uphold basic human 
rights interests have endangered the legitimacy of the human 
rights regime, and should be addressed by binding forums of 
international law.   
From allegations of torture, cruel, inhumane and degrad-
ing treatment, to the unlawful detention of prisoners without 
their due process habeas corpus rights, the United States has 
been at the center of human rights inquiry. As many of the 
abuses have been perpetrated beyond the territory of the Unit-
ed States, the issue of whether human rights instruments ap-
ply extraterritorially is especially pertinent. Unfortunately, the 
United States’ apparent willingness to disregard basic notions 
of human rights throughout the world has created the human 
rights vacuums and legal black holes that court decisions such 
as Al-Skeini sought to avoid.  
A. The Facts 
Though there are human rights issues present within the 
territory of the United States, the most egregious of alleged 
human rights abuses by United States authorities have oc-
curred outside its borders. In the months after September 11, 
2001, the United States began “Operation Enduring Freedom,” 
in which it waged war on the Taliban and Al-Qeada in Afghan-
istan.114 During the Operation, thousands of Afghan civilians 
were killed, and U.S. forces sent hundreds of prisoners to be 
held in the Guantanamo Bay detention center.115 Furthermore, 
during this time, it was alleged that the United States commit-
ted human rights atrocities during the “Dasht-i-Leili Massacre” 
                                                          
112 Joan Fitzpatrick, Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism 
and Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 241, 242 (2003). 
113 Id.   
114 Marjorie Cohn, Human Rights in the Wake of 9/11: Human Rights: 
Casualty of the War on Terror, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 317, 319 (2003). 
115 Id. at 319-21.  
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in Afghanistan.116 The massacre refers to the deaths of hun-
dreds (or possibly thousands) of Taliban prisoners during their 
transportation from Kunduz to Sheberghan prison in Afghani-
stan by U.S. and Junbish-i Milli soldiers.117 According to the 
2002 documentary, Afghan Massacre: The Convoy of Death”118, 
prisoners in the transport “suffocated in closed containers that 
lacked any ventilation,” while those that survived were 
“dumped in the desert, shot and left to be eaten by dogs.”119 
Based on witness accounts, the film claims that United States 
military personnel participated in prisoner executions of some 
who survived the transport.120 
The United States has also been accused of engaging in in-
humane treatment of their detainees abroad. Of the prisoners 
kept in Guantanamo Bay, “many [were] blindfolded, thrown in-
to walls, bound in painful positions, subjected to loud noises 
and deprived of sleep.”121 The United Nations report condemn-
ing the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay included 
“stress positions” for hours, and the use of the detainee’s fears, 
namely dogs, as mechanisms used to intimidate and coerce in-
formation.122  
Moreover, the United States government secretly sent 
many terrorist suspects to be questioned in countries such as 
Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco that have a reputation for utilizing 
brutal means of interrogation. 123 Consequently, the United 
States would not have to take responsibility for any alleged 
human rights abuses occurring during questioning or deten-
tion.124 By outsourcing torture to other nations, while engaging 
in interrogative strategies as severe as “waterboarding,”125 the 
                                                          
116 AFGHAN MASSACRE: THE CONVOY OF DEATH (Atlantic Celtic Films 
2002). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id.  
121 Cohn, supra note 114, at 327.  
122 Economic and Social Council, Situation of detainees at Guantánamo 
Bay, Report of the Chairperson, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006).  
123 Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Inter-
rogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356.html.  
124 Id. 
125 Dan Froomkin, Bush Glib Waterboarding Admission Sparks Outrage, 
HUFFINGTON POST, June 3, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/03/ 
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United States has clearly committed widespread atrocities be-
yond its borders.  
While the crimes committed by United States forces across 
the globe violated several human rights agreements, including 
the Convention Against Torture (CAT), the United Nations 
Charter, and the Third and Fourth Geneva Convention,126 this 
analysis will focus on whether the abuses violate the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) due to its 
territorial restriction on jurisdiction.  
B. The Problem 
While the ECtHR’s decision in Al-Skeini reflects a growing 
international custom indicating a willingness to favor the ob-
ject and purpose of human rights treaties over their “territori-
al” limitations, the United States has neglected to take part in 
it. Unfortunately, the practices of the United States during the 
recent human rights revolution reflects a willingness to sign 
and ratify only the treaties that already comply with their own 
domestic law. 127 When the provisions of a human rights treaty 
do not comply with their already existing law, the United 
States Congress has traditionally ratified it with provisions, ob-
jecting to the contents that may infringe on existing domestic 
law.128 The practice of the United States in regards to its’ rati-
fication of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) is particularly illustrative.  
The ICCPR opened for signature in 1966 and was entered 
into force in 1976.129 The treaty was enacted by the Human 
Rights Commission, which created it alongside the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights in furtherance of an effort to devise mech-
anisms for the “implementation and protection of fundamental 
                                                                                                                                  
bushs-glib-waterboarding_n_599893.html. 
126 Cohn, supra note 114, at 317. The United States has objected to the 
assertion that any of these Agreements have been violated by US practice in 
the “war on terror,” for many reasons which will not be discussed in this pa-
per. 
127 Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Hu-
man Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 347 (2000).  
128 Id. at 349. 
129 Connor Colette, Recent Development: The United States’ Second and 
Third Periodic Report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 49 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 509, 511 (2008). 
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human rights.”130 The United States signed the treaty on Octo-
ber 5, 1977, but did not ratify it until June 8, 1992.131 The rati-
fication came with several reservations, and thus failed to give 
full effect to the breadth of the ICCPR.132 While treaty reserva-
tions are permissible under Article 19 of the Vienna Conven-
tion, many of the United States’ reservations have been publi-
cally criticized as being contrary to the object and purpose of 
the ICCPR.133  
As it ratified the ICCPR in 1977, the United States de-
clared that the provisions of the Covenant were non-self exe-
cuting, thereby asserting that the Treaty’s Articles did not 
amount to a legal obligation.134 Declaring a treaty’s provisions 
as non-self executing does not strip it of its power in itself, but 
once the Justice Department failed to implement the treaty via 
its own domestic legislation, it became essentially non-
binding.135 Additionally, the United States retained the right to 
execute its minors, and indicated that cruel, degrading, and in-
humane treatment would only be interpreted in accordance 
with the United States Constitution.136 In effect, this gave the 
treaty little to no weight, making the ratification of the ICCPR 
                                                          
130 Id. The other Human Rights treaty that was created by the Human 
Rights Commission was the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Though the ICCPR has run into several legitima-
cy problems, the ICESCR has dealt with even greater problems as the lan-
guage in its provisions are generally seen to be more vague and non-self-
executing. Id. at 5. 
131 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 Dec. 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#top 
[hereinafter ICCPR Database]. As of 11/12/11, there are 167 parties to the 
treaty. 
132 Id.  
133 While Article 19 of the Vienna Convention permits a state to attach 
reservations when they sign, ratify, accept, or approve of a treaty, Article 
19(c) does not allow reservations when the reservation is “incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the treaty.” Vienna Convention, supra note 5, Art. 
19(c). In response to the United States’ persistent objection to Article 6(5) 
which prohibits capital punishment for minors, eleven European states filed 
objections declaring the reservation to be invalid on the basis that it went di-
rectly against the aims and purposes of the ICCPR. Inter-American Commis-
sion of Human Rights ¶ 62.  
134 ICCPR Database, supra note 131.  
135 Roth, supra note 127, at 349. By stating the ICCPR is non-self execut-
ing, and failing to domesticate the terms within the Articles of the Covenant, 
the United States effectively stripped the covenant of all its intended power.  
136 ICCPR Database, supra note 131.   
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a “purely cosmetic gesture.”137 As a result, the United States 
can claim to be part of a major human rights system while do-
ing nothing to give life to the rights it embodies.   
Still, by far the biggest failure of the United States to fully 
embrace the nature of the ICCPR lies in its assertion that the 
treaty’s provisions do not apply extraterritorially. Similar to 
the European Convention, the ICCPR contains an article limit-
ing its jurisdictional applicability. Article 2(1) states that 
"[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to re-
spect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant, without distinction of any kind . . . "138 By limiting 
the Covenant’s application to “within its territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction,”139 the scope of its authority is potentially 
diminished. The United States has claimed that based on the 
plain and ordinary meaning of its text, “this Article establishes 
that States Parties are required to ensure the rights in the 
Covenant only to individuals who are both within the territory 
of a State Party and subject to that State Party's sovereign au-
thority.”140  
Supporting their “plain and ordinary meaning” interpreta-
tion of Article 2(1), the United States brought in the travaux 
preparatoire of Eleanor Roosevelt, who was the US representa-
tive for the Commission on Human Rights in 1950, when Arti-
cle 2 was being drafted.141 Roosevelt’s travaux indicated that 
the United States was concerned with being held accountable 
for actions occurring within then occupied Germany, and there-
fore proposed the language within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction.142 From this, the United States alleges that it 
is clear that the treaty should not apply extraterritorially.  
Ironically, the United States’ argument relies almost com-
pletely on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, an 
                                                          
137 Roth, supra note 127, at 349.  
138 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Oct. 5, 
1977, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (emphasis added).  
139 Id. 
140 REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE 
REPORT OF THE FIVE UNCHR SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS ON DETAINEES IN 
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agreement it has failed to ratify.143  The United States recog-
nized that it never ratified the Convention, yet stated that it is 
“often consulted as a guide to general principles of treaty inter-
pretation.”144 This assertion appears to treat the Convention as 
international custom, a source of authority not often invoked by 
the United States when dealing with human rights treaties.  
A closer look at international custom concerning the extra-
territorial nature of human rights treaties, and more specifical-
ly, the ICCPR, shows that the “plain and ordinary meaning” 
approach is not sufficient. The United States’ position disre-
gards the fact that in the past half-century since the enactment 
of the ICCPR, the world has witnessed a human rights revolu-
tion.145 Consistently with modern international custom, it 
would not be “tenable for the US to continue to maintain that 
its human rights obligations stay at home while its armed forc-
es go abroad.”146  
In 1980, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) held in a 
case in Uruguay, that the Convention should not be interpreted 
so as to apply to all individuals under its jurisdiction regardless 
of whether they are under their territory.147 Dealing with a 
case in which the plaintiff was abducted within Uruguay, and 
subsequently taken outside its borders to be tortured, the 
Committee stated that “it would be unconscionable to so inter-
pret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to 
permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant 
on the territory of another State, which violations it could not 
perpetrate on its own territory.”148 The HRC recognized that it 
would be “unconscionable” to interpret Article 2(1) as requiring 
both “within the territory” and “subject to its jurisdiction,”149 
and adopted a much more teleological interpretation of the Ar-
                                                          
143 The United States has often held that when it does not ratify a Trea-
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ticle.  
In a 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), concerning Israel’s building of a wall in occupied 
Palestine, the ICJ held that while the ICCPR’s jurisdiction was 
“primarily territorial,” there were circumstances under which it 
could be exercised outside of the national territory.150 The 
Court further held that, “considering the object and purpose of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it 
would seem natural that, even when such is the case, States 
parties to the Covenant should be bound to comply with its 
provisions.”151 Regarding the intent of the framers in drafting 
the language of Article 2(1), the Court stated: “the drafters of 
the Covenant did not intend to allow States to escape from 
their obligations when they exercise jurisdiction outside their 
national territory.”152  
Both the 1980 HRC decision and the 2004 ICJ advisory 
opinion represent the international custom that has developed 
contrary to the United States’ stance on the ICCPR’s extrater-
ritorial capacity. The United States, however, has continued to 
claim that the treaty does not apply extraterritorially, failing to 
mention actions it induced outside its borders in its periodic 
reports to the Human Rights Committee.153 Though the HRC 
has obtained information on the controversial situations in 
Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan through “shadow re-
ports” submitted by nongovernmental organizations,154 the 
Committee’s recommendations have had little effect on United 
States foreign policy. The HRC lacked any substantial binding 
authority before the First Optional Protocol, which gave the 
Committee the power to issue “authoritative determina-
tions.”155 The United States, however, has not ratified the Op-
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tional Protocol, and has never officially recognized the treaty as 
binding law.156  
While the United States is technically a party to the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, its State prac-
tice has indicated a more ‘a la carte’ compliance with the rights 
the treaty enshrines. This Nation’s disregard for the treaty led 
one respected scholar to claim that “rarely has a treaty been so 
abused.”157 Until the United States can take steps to truly 
abide by the ICCPR, its ratification will continue to be purely 
‘cosmetic,’ furthering the United States perspective that trea-
ties should only be ratified to further “codify existing U.S. prac-
tice,” while doing nothing to compel the further protection of 
human rights.158 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision in Al-Skeini et al. v. United Kingdom 
was yet another example of a growing international custom in-
dicating that human rights treaties should be applied extrater-
ritorially. In light of the human rights revolution the world has 
witnessed over the past half-century, this case stands as a posi-
tive reinforcement of an evolving conventional norm. Human 
rights treaties should be applied consistent with their object 
and purpose and not hamstrung by the confines of territorial 
restriction. The Preamble of the European Convention stated a 
goal to ensure the universal recognition of human rights.159 To 
contradict this notion would be to defy the very purpose of the 
treaty. The Court in Al-Skeini recognized this principle and is-
sued a decision consistent with modern international law.  
Sadly, the United States’ continued unwillingness to apply 
the human rights regime throughout the world greatly weak-
ens the progress of the entire international community in de-
veloping a strong international custom. Even more discourag-
ing is the near purposeful nature of the United States’ 
disregard of international law. While the United Kingdom 
raised Article 1 defenses in the Al-Skeini case, it has accepted 
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culpability for its actions in Iraq, and acknowledged the EC-
tHR’s decision. The United States, however, has not hid its 
willingness to perpetrate human rights violations, leading one 
CIA official to state that "[i]f you don't violate someone's hu-
man rights some of the time, you probably aren't doing your 
job,” 160 and former Vice President Dick Cheney to state that 
waterboarding was a “no-brainer.”161 This whimsical attitude 
towards human rights violations is especially worrisome.  
Unfortunately, the actions of the United States have di-
minished much of what the human rights regime can accom-
plish against other severe violators. As a violator itself, the 
United States has lost its influence in advocating for human 
rights interests elsewhere. In 2002, Amnesty International said 
that the administration had “lost the moral authority to criti-
cize human rights abuses abroad, because of its own denial of 
human rights to foreigners detained since September 11.”162 
Human Rights Watch agreed by stating that the message sent 
by the United States is that of which “human rights are dis-
pensable in the name of fighting terrorism.”163 The unfortunate 
result has been a copy-cat approach where many already re-
pressive governments have used the “war on terror” to justify 
abusive military campaigns on their domestic political oppo-
nents.164  While by no means is the United States the biggest 
human rights abuser, Human Rights Watch stated that “Wash-
ington has so much power today that when it flouts human 
rights standards, it damages human rights causes world-
wide.”165   
In recent years, however, the United States has taken 
steps that may indicate there has been a ‘turning of the tide’ in 
its treatment of international human rights agreements. Secre-
tary of State Hillary Clinton recently stated “a commitment to 
human rights starts with universal standards and with holding 
everyone accountable to those standards, including our-
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selves.”166 Clinton further claimed that human rights are 
“rights that apply everywhere, to everyone.”167 Additionally, 
President Barack Obama noted in an address to the United 
Nations General Council Assembly in 2009, that “[t]he world 
must stand together to demonstrate that international law is 
not an empty promise, and that Treaties will be enforced.”168 
While these statements mean nothing without corresponding 
action, the current administration’s beliefs are much more 
amenable to complying with norms of international law than 
those of its predecessor.  
The encouraging attitude of the Obama administration 
may indicate that the United States has begun to hold itself ac-
countable for its actions abroad. Recently, Harold Hongiy Koh, 
Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State commented that 
the relationship between the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) had changed from “hostility to positive engagement.”169 
The United States had previously held it would not join the 
ICC. 
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has shown 
a willingness to apply international law to its domestic practice 
in its decisions in Roper v. Simmons,170 which abolished the ju-
venile death penalty, and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,171 which held 
that military commissions established to try detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay violate the Geneva Conventions. This State 
practice demonstrates that, at the very least, the United States 
is realizing the presence of international law within their judi-
cial decisions. 
Though the United States may be making progress to-
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wards respecting treaties such as the ICCPR, it must under-
stand the significance of its global footprint as it relates to in-
ternational custom in the human rights regime. The Al-Skeini 
decision declares that the human rights regime applies univer-
sally, but the United States has yet to affirm that decision by 
applying the ICCPR to their state practice. The interests of 
human rights are bigger than “American Exceptionalism,” and 
the United States should begin to take them seriously. Until 
this occurs, the human rights vacuums and legal black holes 
will continue to exist across the world, and the interests of 
those harmed will suffer.  
 
 
 
